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Abstract:  It has been argued that cognitively constrained consumers respond sub-
optimally to complex decision problems, and that firms can exploit these limitations by 
introducing spurious complexity into tariff structures, weakening price competition.  We 
model a countervailing force.  Restricting one’s choices to the most easily comparable 
options is a psychologically well-attested heuristic.  Consumers who use this heuristic 
favour firms that follow common conventions about tariff structures.  Because a ‘common 
standard’ promotes price competition, a firm’s use of it signals that it offers value for 
money, validating the heuristic.  This allows an equilibrium in which firms use common 
standards and set competitive prices.  (100 words) 
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There is growing evidence that consumers can find it difficult to process complex decision 
problems.  As a result, they may fail to choose in accordance with what, after sufficient 
reflection, they would acknowledge to be their own best interests.  The recognition of this 
problem by behavioural economists is producing a literature which advocates regulatory 
interventions to simplify consumers’ choice problems (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003a, 2003b; 
Camerer et al, 2003; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  A complementary literature in industrial 
organisation is investigating whether profit-maximising firms can exploit consumers’ 
cognitive limitations by introducing spurious complexity into tariff structures.  The typical 
finding is that firms have incentives to follow such strategies, and that their doing so tends 
to raise prices for cognitively or informationally constrained consumers (Ellison, 2005; 
Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Spiegler, 2006; Ellison and Ellison, 2009).  These findings 
appear to strengthen the case for regulation by showing that, in the absence of regulation, 
consumers do not merely have to navigate the ‘natural’ complexity of competitive markets; 
they also have to cope with unnecessary complexity which has been deliberately created to 
confuse them. 
  In this paper, we argue that these literatures neglect an important countervailing 
force: the common standard effect.  The essential idea is that consumers’ choice problems 
are made less complex if competing firms follow common conventions about tariff 
structures, package sizes, labelling, and so on.  Cognitively constrained consumers can be 
expected to simplify decision problems by focusing attention on those options that are most 
easily comparable, and hence to favour products which meet common standards.  By 
facilitating comparisons between products, common standards promote competition 
between the firms that follow them.  But, precisely because they promote competition, they 
also signal that goods that meet common standards are likely to offer good value for 
money; this reinforces the tendency for consumers to favour common standards.  If 
consumers behave in this way, profit-seeking firms are penalised for deviating from 
common standards.    
  We present a model of a market in which, in the absence of common standards, 
consumers would find it difficult to make accurate comparisons between the tariffs of 
competing firms, allowing firms to set prices above the competitive level.  We investigate 
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cognitive limitations, common standards can be self-sustaining. 
  The common standard effect can be distinguished from other market mechanisms 
which promote the simplification of consumers’ choice problems.  In particular, it should 
be distinguished from those mechanisms which work through the incentive for individual 
firms to build reputations as trading partners who provide value for money, rather than 
seeking to trap unwary consumers.  The common standard effect is a complementary but 
distinct mechanism, which works at the level of the market rather than the firm.  Common 
standards are market-wide conventions.  Firms reveal themselves as offering value for 
money, not by signalling their individual identities as reliable trading partners, but by 
displaying features that are characteristic of reliable firms in general.   
  The hypothesis that price competition can be frustrated by the bounded rationality 
of economic agents must be distinguished from the more general idea that deviations from 
traditional rationality assumptions have implications for the behaviour of profit-maximising 
firms.  Among the non-standard preferences or ‘biases’ whose effects have been 
investigated are dynamic inconsistency (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004, 2006; Eliaz 
and Spiegler, 2006), over-confidence (Grubb, 2008), and loss aversion (Heidhues and 
Koszegi, 2004).  This distinction is significant in the light of Sugden’s (2004, 2009) 
demonstration that competitive markets can be efficient in generating opportunities for 
individual consumers, whether or not they have well-defined or consistent preferences, 
provided that they buy only at the lowest price posted in the market and sell only at the 
highest.  Thus, if the normative criterion is one of opportunity, competitive markets have 
desirable properties independently of the rationality or irrationality of consumers’ 
preferences.  But if price competition itself were obstructed by the bounded rationality of 
consumers, the opportunity-based defence of markets would be compromised. 
  
1.  Common standards 
A common theme in the discussion of spurious complexity is that price competition can be 
blunted if the prices that are posted by sellers provide the information that is relevant for 
price comparisons only indirectly, and if that information can be reconstructed only at some 
cost in terms of search or cognitive effort, or with some probability of error.  For example, 
a package of services that would more naturally be priced as a single entity can be broken 
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want to know the price of the whole package, and introduces the possibility (which sellers 
may find ways of making more probable) that buyers overlook some components in 
calculating that price.  This form of complexity is exemplified by some forms of add-on 
pricing (Ellison, 2005; Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Ellison and Ellison, 2009) and, for 
contingency-related services such as health insurance or retail banking, the practice of 
posting different prices or reimbursement schedules for different contingencies (Spiegler, 
2006).  Another way in which posted prices may not allow direct comparisons across 
products is through the use of different quantity units. For example, different sellers of a 
product may use different package sizes and display per-package rather than per-unit prices, 
or use different conventions of measurement, such as different statistics for expressing 
interest rates. 
  Common to all these examples is the idea that price comparisons are facilitated if, in 
providing price information, competing suppliers use a common standard. By ‘standard’, 
we mean a well-defined statistic (or array of statistics) which, if known by consumers, is 
informative about the pricing schedule of each of a set of competing firms and allows 
comparisons between those schedules.  If two or more firms express their prices using the 
same standard, that standard is ‘common’ to them.  In contrast, a standard which is used by 
only one firm is ‘individuated’.  If suppliers use individuated standards when an 
informative common standard could have been used instead, spurious complexity is 
created.   
  The imposition of common standards is a familiar form of market regulation.  For 
example, there are EU regulations which require the display of prices per metric unit of 
weight or volume, which require prices to be expressed inclusive of taxes, and which 
require interest charges to be expressed using a standard annual percentage rate formula.  
Until 2009, EU regulations also required many pre-packaged consumer products to be sold 
only in limited ranges of package sizes so as to facilitate price comparisons.  In Singapore, 
the mark-up that hotels charge on international phone calls is capped by law (Gabaix and 
Laibson, 2006: 531). 
  However, it is illuminating to consider whether common standards can be sustained 
in the absence of regulation.  We suggest that some common standards have emerged 
spontaneously and have persisted for relatively long periods as self-enforcing conventions.  
For example, consider the practice of add-on pricing.  Writers on this topic can point to 
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minibar drinks in hotels.  But it is equally instructive to notice that generic references to 
such examples are possible only because readers can be expected to know that, across a 
whole market sector, particular services are standardly (over-)priced as add-ons, while 
others are standardly included in the basic price.  Thus, most mid-range hotels treat minibar 
drinks as add-ons but do not charge for the use of in-room coffee-making facilities, 
toiletries or trouser-presses.  Similarly, the prices posted by ‘full-service’ airlines have for 
many years standardly included normal check-in baggage and on-board meals and soft 
drinks.
1  We conjecture that such conventions are self-enforcing because firms expect that 
unilateral deviations would be perceived by consumers as sharp practice, and would induce 
a loss of confidence in the meaningfulness of their posted prices. 
  Of course, there are now expanding sectors of budget hotels and budget airlines 
which do not follow full-service conventions.  But it is significant that firms in these budget 
sectors typically advertise themselves as offering new business models, rather than trying to 
pass themselves off as full-service suppliers.  For example, the website of Travelodge (the 
leading UK budget hotel chain) declares ‘We keeps costs low by cutting out things you 
don’t need’ and ‘Most people staying in a hotel simply want a clean, comfortable place to 
get a good night’s sleep, and are happy to forgo the unnecessary “frills” offered in other 
stuffy, over-priced establishments’.  Rather than providing these frills as high-priced add-
ons, Travelodge either does not supply them at all (there are no bath mats), offers them free 
of charge to customers who specifically ask for them (extra towels are available at 
reception), or sells them at low prices (there are no chocolates on your pillow, but snacks 
can be bought at a vending machine).
2  It seems that Travelodge is deliberately trying to 
educate consumers in a new set of conventions about hotel services and pricing.   
  An example of the emergence of a standard was observed by Ellison and Ellison 
(2009: 434–435) during their study of Pricewatch, an internet search engine for the 
purchase of computer parts.  At first, Pricewatch did not collect information on shipping 
costs, and ‘it was not uncommon for firms to list a price of $1 for a memory module and 
inform consumers of a $40 “shipping and handling” fee at check out’.  To protect the value 
of the price-comparison service that it was supplying, Pricewatch required all firms to offer 
a standard form of ground shipping with prescribed maximum charges.  It also added a 
column to its listing in which firms could display shipping cost; customers were explicitly 
warned to be wary of firms which left the column blank.  As a result, many (but not all) 
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our sense.  For a typical Pricewatch user, the package for which price information is 
relevant is the combination of a physical product and shipping; a convention by which all 
suppliers post the same shipping fee reduces the dimensionality of price comparisons.  In 
this case, the emergence of a common standard seems to have been partly the result of 
‘regulation’ by a market intermediary and partly spontaneous. 
  Intuitively, it seems that we are observing a balance of forces, some of which 
support the emergence of common standards while others support deviation from those 
standards.  The existing literature on spurious complexity has concentrated on the latter.  
Our paper is an attempt to redress the balance. 
         
2.  The asymmetric dominance and shortlisting heuristics 
Imagine that EU and UK regulations on the display of prices have been repealed and many 
British firms have gone back to using Imperial units.  You have just driven off a ferry at 
Dover and need to fill up your car with petrol.  You see three filling stations, A, B and C, 
with no obvious differences between them apart from the prices they are displaying.  These 
are £1.05 per litre (at A), £4.75 per Imperial gallon (at B), and £4.76 per Imperial gallon (at 
C).  You are not good at arithmetic, you have no pocket calculator, and you can’t remember 
the conversion factor between gallons and litres.
3  Which filling station should you choose? 
  Clearly you should not choose C, since B is certainly cheaper than C.  One simple 
heuristic is to choose B on the grounds that B is at least cheaper than some alternative, 
while A is not. 
  This way of reaching a decision can be interpreted as an instance of the more 
general heuristic of asymmetric dominance.  Consider any three options x, y and z that can 
be located on two dimensions of value; y dominates z while x neither dominates nor is 
dominated by either y or z.  (For example, suppose that x, y and z are different brands of AA 
battery and the two dimensions are cheapness and durability; the brands are ranked <x, y, 
z> in descending order of cheapness and <y, z, x> in descending order of durability.)  For a 
wide class of decision problems, it has been found that individuals are more likely to 
choose y when the opportunity set is {x, y, z} than when it is {x, y}.  This effect has been 
found both for human and non-human decision-makers; it is recognised (as the decoy effect) 
in the literature of marketing (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982; Shafir, Simonson and Tversky, 
  7
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 0841993; Shafir, Waite and Smith, 2002).  It seems that individuals who have difficulty 
ranking x and y directly treat the dominance relation between y and z as if it were a positive 
indicator of the value of y relative to x.  Analogously in the case of the filling stations: if it 
is difficult to compare A and B, the unambiguous superiority of B to C provides a ‘reason’ 
for choosing B rather than A. 
  Another way of describing the asymmetric dominance effect is as a shortlisting 
heuristic for simplifying decision problems.  One familiar way of limiting the cognitive 
demands of a decision problem is to begin by using ‘quick and dirty’ criteria to reduce the 
set of options to a more manageable shortlist.  One such criterion, which has obvious utility 
if the aim is to reduce cognitive demands, is to eliminate options which would not be easy 
to compare with other items on the shortlist.  (For example, consider an employer drawing 
up a shortlist of candidates for a job.  Suppose that most candidates have at least adequate 
educational qualifications of some standard kind.  If one candidate has non-standard and 
not obviously superior qualifications, that is likely to disadvantage her in the shortlisting 
process.)  In effect, the asymmetric dominance heuristic selects a shortlist which, because 
its elements can be ranked by a dominance relation, makes decision-making particularly 
easy. 
  This shortlisting criterion is not as illogical as it might at first appear.  Consider 
again the example of the filling stations.  Suppose that all three prices have been drawn at 
random from the same unknown distribution (in which prices are expressed in, say, £/litre), 
and that a second, independent random process has determined whether each price is 
displayed as £/litre or as the £/gallon equivalent.  If all you know in addition to this that B 
is cheaper than C, then B has the lowest expected price of the three.  (The expected price at 
A is the mean of one random draw from the distribution; the expected price at B is the 
mean of the minimum of two random draws.)
4 
  We suggest that, in markets in which tariffs can be spuriously complex, there is 
some tendency for consumers to use shortlisting heuristics which favour common 
standards.  That is, when it is possible to do so, consumers are inclined to simplify their 
decision problems by eliminating offers that are expressed in individuated standards.  In the 
example of the filling stations, such a heuristic would favour B (whose Imperial standard is 
shared with C) over A (whose metric standard is individuated). 
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expressed in common standards are systematically different from those expressed in 
individuated standards.  We have argued that heuristics which favour common standards 
are psychologically salient, and that they can be ecologically valid even when the true value 
of an option is uncorrelated with the standard in which its price is expressed.  We now 
show that there can be a Nash equilibrium for firms in which consumers’ use of such a 
heuristic induces firms to charge competitive prices.  Further, we show that, in any Nash 
equilibrium in which consumers’ choices between tariffs satisfy a cognitively undemanding 
condition of ‘price sensitivity’, heuristics which favour common standards are utility-
maximising.   
     
3.  The model 
We present a model which shows the common standard effect at work in a very simple 
environment.
5  For clarity in exposition, we adapt Jeffrey Perloff and Steven Salop’s (1985) 
well-known model of a market with product differentiation.  We focus on a market for a 
single consumer good, sold directly by producers to consumers.  We consider the 
possibility that sellers might try to exploit the cognitive limitations of buyers by introducing 
spurious complexity into their pricing structures. 
  Although this case is chosen mainly for ease of modelling, it has practical interest in 
its own right.  There are many examples, particularly in the telecommunications, electricity, 
gas and water industries, of markets in which firms compete to supply exactly the same 
product to consumers.  In Britain, for example, domestic consumers can choose between 
competing electricity and gas suppliers, but the consumer has access to the same power and 
pipeline grids, irrespective of which supplier she chooses.  In this environment, competition 
can only be in terms of prices.  Suppliers typically offer a wide choice of tariffs, apparently 
catering to different patterns of electricity and gas use.  There is evidence that consumers 
often fail to choose the lowest-cost supplier, which raises the possibility that tariff 
complexity is reducing competition (Wilson and Waddams Price, 2006). 
  Our formal model is of a one-period market for a good which is supplied by n 
competing firms, where n  3.
6   In interpreting the model, however, we imagine a 
sequence of periods in which the market is repeated, during which firms learn to follow
optimal strategies and (more slowly) boundedly rational consumers gravitate towards 
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that N/n is sufficiently large to legitimate the use of the law of large numbers when 
analysing the effects on firms of random variation at the level of the consumer.  Each 
consumer buys a fixed quantity of the good, the same for all consumers; her problem is 
simply to satisfy this given demand at the lowest cost.  As a normalisation, we define th
quantity to be one consumption unit of the good.  However, we do not assume tha
consumer is consciously aware of this concept of quantity.  As an example of the kind of 
situation to which our model might apply, consider a consumer who contracts with an
electricity supplier to buy power according to a particular tariff over a fixed period, and 
then uses electricity as she needs it, without taking any account of the specificities of that 
tariff.  At the end of the period, she is billed for whatever she has consumed (which, in fac
will be one ‘consumption unit’).  The tariff might, for example, comprise a fixed charge, a 
charge per daytime kilowatt hour (kWh) and a charge per night-time kWh.  In our 
terminology, a consumption unit is the consumer’s total consumption over the billing 
period, distributed between day and night according to the consumer’s pattern of electric
use (which, by assumption, is independent of the tariff).  The consumer might have only a 
very hazy idea of how her consumption converts into kilowatt hours at different times of 






 line of the bill. 
  In this environment, there is scope for spurious complexity in tariff structures.  
Since purchases are the same for all consumers and are independent of the tariff under 
which they are bought, the relevant information in any tariff can be expressed as a single 
price, defined as the amount charged for one consumption unit.  However, there are many 
different ways of presenting this information.  As in our previous example, the unit might 
be subdivided into separately-priced components by using multi-part tariffs, or by charging 
different rates for consumption at different times of day.  If two firms present their price 
information in sufficiently different forms, it may be difficult for consumers to work out 
which is offering the lower overall price.  We represent this idea by modelling a tariff as a 
combination of a price and a standard.  The price is an objective property of the tariff, 
about which the consumer is not directly informed.  The standard is the device by which 
this information is presented.  Any given standard is capable of expressing any given price.  
We will assume that each consumer’s ‘reading’ of any tariff is subject to random error; 
thus, each tariff provides only a noisy signal of its true price.  However, if two tariffs use 
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corresponding prices. 
  As an illustration of the underlying idea, suppose that electricity tariff A has a fixed 
charge of £20 and a unit charge of £0.13 per kWh.  Tariff B has a fixed charge of £10 per 
month and a unit charge of £0.14 per kWh.  Tariff C has a fixed charge of £10 per month 
and a unit charge of £0.15 per kWh.  Consider an individual whose average electricity 
consumption is 530 kWh/month.  At this rate of consumption, a month’s electricity will in 
fact cost £88.90 on tariff A, £84.20 on tariff B, and £89.50 on tariff C.  If the individual is 
unsure about her rate of consumption, or is not good at arithmetic, her estimates of how 
much she would have to pay on each tariff may be subject to a good deal of error.  
However, it is easy for her to see that B is a cheaper tariff than C, even if she does not know 
how much less she will pay on B than on C.  In the language of our model, the 
‘consumption unit’ is 530 kWh/month, and the ‘prices’ charged by A, B and C are £88.90, 
£84.20 and £89.50.  B and C are using a ‘common standard’ which allows ordinal 
comparisons of their prices to be made on a single dimension.
7 
  In most real-world cases, different consumers, even when fully informed, may have 
different preferences over tariffs.  In the case of multi-part electricity tariffs, for example, 
consumers whose demand is relatively low will prefer tariffs with low fixed charges and 
high rates per unit, while those with high demand will prefer the opposite.  Thus, when 
consumers are differentiated, complexity in tariff structure can play a role in tailoring 
firms’ offers to the tastes of individual consumers and in facilitating price discrimination.  
Even so, it remains true that complexity can make it harder for consumers to compare the 
offers of competing firms.  The implication is that, from the viewpoint of consumers, there 
can be too much complexity and differentiation in tariff structures.  Our modelling strategy 
allows us to isolate the component that is ‘too much’: the assumption that every consumer 
buys one consumption unit, irrespective of the tariff, allows the concept of  ‘spurious’ 
complexity to be given a simple definition.
8 
  In our model, each firm i has the same increasing and differentiable total cost 
function C(qi) where qi is the firm’s output, measured in consumption units.  C(.) has a 
minimum efficient scale (MES) q*, such that q*  N/n (so that, if consumer spending is 
distributed evenly between firms, all firms produce at or above MES).  For qi  q*, C(qi) = 
cqi, where c represents both average and marginal cost.  For qi  q*, average cost (AC) is 
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costs, so that average cost tends to infinity as quantity tends to zero.
9  There is no exit 
option for firms; thus each firm must incur at least the cost C(0), even if its sales are zero.  
Figure 1 illustrates these assumptions. 
  In assuming a MES cost function, rather than one with constant average and 
marginal cost at all levels of output, we differ from Perloff and Salop and from many other 
models of markets with fixed numbers of firms.  The latter type of cost function is often 
convenient in modelling because it implies a unique competitive price at which firms of 
different sizes can coexist.  However, because it assumes the total absence of fixed costs, it 
has the unrealistic implication that a firm that sells a positive quantity, however small, at 
any price greater than marginal cost makes positive profit.  Under this assumption, a 
competitive equilibrium would not be possible if any consumers could be induced by 
spurious complexity to pay more than the competitive price.  It is more realistic to assume 
that if a firm unilaterally deviates from a putative competitive equilibrium by raising its 
price, it may earn either positive or negative profit, depending on the size of its market 
share after the price increase.  An MES function has many of the convenient properties of a 
constant-cost function while allowing the effects of fixed costs to be modelled. 
  Firms seek to maximise expected profit.  Each firm i sets a tariff (pi, si) where pi is 
its price per consumption unit and si is its standard; pi is chosen from the set of strictly 
positive real numbers, and si from an infinite set S of possible standards.  If the tariffs of 
any two firms i, j have the property that si = sj = s*, we will say that these firms use s* as a 
common standard.  If (and only if) i and j use a common standard, each consumer is 
informed of the true ranking of their prices.  In consequence, each consumer has incomplete 
ranking information which can be represented by a partial ordering R of the set {p1, ..., pn}.  
Notice that there can be more than one common standard in the market.  A standard that is 
used by only one firm is individuated. 
  Each consumer’s problem is to choose one (and only one) of these tariffs.  For a 
representative consumer h, the ex post utility of choosing the tariff of firm i is  – pi, where 
 is the subjective value of a consumption unit supplied by any firm, normalised to 
monetary units.  We implicitly assume that this value is sufficiently high that consumers 
always want to buy rather than not.  If the ex post utility of each tariff was known to 
consumers ex ante, we would have a model of Bertrand competition.  Instead, we assume 
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model these limitations as follows. 
  Consider any consumer h assessing the tariff of any firm i.  We assume that, in 
addition to any information in the partial ordering R, the consumer receives a price signal 
rhi where rhi = pi + ehi.  Here ehi is an error term, representing the cognitive difficulty of 
inferring the price per consumption unit from the information provided by the tariff.  We 
assume that ehi is an iid random variable with zero mean, bounded support and a continuous 
and differentiable single-peaked density function.
10   
  We assume a strategic interaction in which firms move first, simultaneously posting 
tariffs to which they are then committed.  Next, each consumer chooses one of the posted 
tariffs; these choices determine the sales of each firm.  Firms produce to meet these 
demands and incur the corresponding costs.  Finally, consumers are billed for the quantities 
they have bought. 
  Given the tariffs chosen by firms, each consumer h receives the information triple Ih 
= (s, rh, R), where s = (s1, ..., sn) is the n-tuple of standards chosen by firms, rh = (rh1, ..., rhn) 
is the n-tuple of price signals received by h, and R is the incomplete ranking information.  
We define a decision rule for consumer h as a function fh which, to each logically possible 
information triple Ih, assigns a probability distribution fh(Ih) over firms; this probability 
distribution determines the probability with which consumer h chooses the tariff of each 
firm, given the information Ih. 
  As the set of possible decision rules is very large, and as our topic is the 
implications for markets of consumers’ bounded rationality, we will not assume that 
consumers use optimal decision rules.  Our formal analysis will treat consumers’ decision 
rules as exogenous.  Given a specification of decision rules, our model describes a 
simultaneous-move game for firms, in which the set of pure strategies available to each 
firm i is the set of possible tariffs and in which payoffs are expected profits.  We will 
investigate the Nash equilibria of such games.  This analysis will be supplemented by a less 
formal discussion of the implications of assuming that, in a dynamic setting, consumers 
gradually learn to use decision rules that are expected-utility maximising, given the 
equilibrium behaviour of firms.    
 
4.  Decision rules  
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following two conditions that a decision rule fh might satisfy: 
Rational use of ranking information (RURI):  If there are firms i, j such that si = sj 
and pi < pj, then the tariff of firm j is chosen with probability zero by consumer h. 
Rational use of signal information (RUSI):  If there are firms i, j such that si and sj 
are individuated standards and rhi < rhj, then the tariff of firm j is chosen with 
probability zero by consumer h. 
RURI is a simple condition with a self-evident rationale: if the consumer knows that firm 
i’s price is lower than firm j’s, there is no reason to buy from j.  RUSI is clearly rational 
too, provided that the consumer has no information, additional to that in Ih, with which to 
distinguish between individuated standards.  Given our interpretation of price signals as the 
consumer’s best estimates of actual prices, RUSI seems psychologically salient: if the only 
perceptible difference between two tariffs is that one appears to have a lower price than the 
other, what reason can there be for choosing the one with the apparently higher price?  
Decision rules which satisfy RURI and RUSI will be called price-sensitive.  We will 
restrict our attention to Nash equilibria in which consumers are price-sensitive.
11 
  The simplicity of the conditions RURI and RUSI reflects the fact that each of them 
operates on only one kind of price information (rankings and signals respectively).  
Optimally combining the two kinds of information is a difficult mathematical problem.  At 
this point, one might expect consumers to rely on simplifying heuristics or algorithms.  We 
now specify such an algorithm, based on a shortlisting operation of the kind discussed in 
Section 2: 
Largest common standard (LCS):  If there is at least one standard that is common to 
two or more firms, select the common standard that is used by the largest number of 
firms; then choose the lowest price associated with that standard.  If all firms use 
individuated standards, choose the lowest price signal.  Whenever there are ties 
(between standards, between prices or between signals), break them by 
randomisation. 
Whenever possible, this algorithm reduces the decision problem to the largest (non-
singleton) set from which a choice can be made by using ranking information.  Because 
ranking information is used at the second stage, RURI is satisfied.  Because the decision is 
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Thus, the LCS algorithm induces a price-sensitive decision rule. 
  We will show that this algorithm can support a Nash equilibrium in which all firms 
post the competitive price.  However, it will be useful to compare LCS with two other 
simple and price-sensitive algorithms.  The first of these is: 
Dominance editing (DE):  For every standard that is common to two or more firms, 
eliminate all firms using that standard except the one with the lowest price.  Then 
choose the lowest price signal from among non-eliminated firms.  Whenever there 
are ties, break them by randomisation. 
This algorithm uses a psychologically salient editing operation – that of deleting dominated 
options before applying more sophisticated decision criteria – that has been identified 
experimentally in other decision contexts (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
  While LCS favours common standards, DE is biased towards individuated 
standards.  For example, take a case (such as the electricity tariffs of Section 3 or the filling 
stations of Section 2) in which there are three firms and two standards: one standard is 
unique to firm A, the other is common to firms B and C.  Suppose that all three firms post 
the same price.  LCS selects A, B and C with probabilities 0, 0.5 and 0.5 respectively.  The 
corresponding probabilities for DE are 0.5, 0.25 and 0.25.  The final algorithm we consider, 
although less well-grounded in experimental psychology than LCS and DE, is neutral 
between individuated and common standards: 
Signal first (SF):  Provisionally select the firm with the lowest price signal.  Then 
restrict the choice to the set of firms which use the same standard as the 
provisionally selected firm; choose the lowest price associated with that standard.  
Whenever there are ties, break them by randomisation. 
Applied to the example, SF would select each of A, B and C with probability 0.33. 
 
5.  IS equilibrium 
In this section we investigate a class of Nash equilibria in which consumers are price-
sensitive and all firms set individuated standards. 
  In the equilibria we consider, each firm sets its standard at random.  This kind of 
randomisation seems to be essential for a credible equilibrium in which standards are 
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stochastic individuated standard.  Assume for simplicity that all firms post the same price.  
Any firm can deviate from this putative equilibrium by selecting the same standard as 
another firm and marginally undercutting the latter’s price.  Given a credible specification 
of consumers’ decision rules, such a deviation would increase the market share of the 
deviant firm.  (For example, this would be the case if consumers used any of the algorithms 
LCS, DE or SF.)  Thus, if the price in the putative equilibrium were above the competitive 
level c, any firm could increase its profit by a unilateral deviation.  As we will show later, it 
is not compatible with equilibrium for individuated-standard firms to set prices at or below 
c. 
  We now define a class of equilibria with individuated standards or, for short, IS 
equilibria.  In an IS equilibrium, each firm i chooses its standard si at random, 
independently of other firms.  Since S is an infinite set, the probability that any two firms 
choose the same standard is zero.  Each consumer h chooses to buy from the firm with the 
lowest price signal rhi.  Notice that this behaviour would be induced by any price-sensitive 
decision rule.  The prices posted by the firms are such that no firm can increase its profit by 
unilaterally changing its price while continuing to randomise its standard.  Given that all 
other firms randomise their standards, no firm can increase (or reduce) its profits by 
choosing its own standard deterministically, since the probability that a common standard 
will result remains zero.  Thus, we have characterised a class of Nash equilibria in the game 
played by firms.  In any such equilibrium, each consumer’s behaviour is optimal, 
conditional on the information available to her. 
  A proof presented by Perloff and Salop (1985) can be adapted to show the existence 
of an IS equilibrium.  Suppose that all firm post the same price p
I.  Then (provided that the 
value of  is high enough to allow an internal solution) there is exactly one value of p
I that 
is consistent with IS equilibrium; this price is greater than c, which implies that firms make 
positive profits.
12  Here is an intuitive sketch of the proof. 
  The following is a necessary condition for any Nash equilibrium in which standards 
are individuated and firms’ prices are non-stochastic: for any firm i, its price pi must 
maximise its profit with respect to its conjectural demand function – that is, the function 
that plots how the quantity qi sold by firm i varies with pi when all other firms’ prices 
remain unchanged.  It is an elementary result in the theory of the firm that the marginal 
condition for profit-maximisation with respect to price is: 
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The LHS of (1) is the price-cost margin; the RHS is the reciprocal of the price elasticity of 
conjectural demand (expressed as a positive number). 
  Suppose that all firms except one (say, firm j) set the price p
I.  Let (p
I) be the price 
elasticity of conjectural demand for firm j, expressed as a positive number and evaluated at 
pj = p
I.  Notice that when all firms set the same price, the quantity sold by each firm is N/n 
which, by assumption, is not less than MES; so, for each firm, marginal and average cost is 
c.  Thus, adapting (1), p
I is an equilibrium price if and only if 
(2) (p
I – c)/p
I   =  1/(p
I).    
Now consider the determinants of (p
I).  It follows from the specification of rhi that, if all 
firms except j charge p
I, the probability that j’s price signal is the lowest for any given 
consumer depends only (and negatively) on pj – p
I.  Thus, the gradient of j’s conjectural 
demand curve at pj = p
I is independent of p
I.  Since the quantity sold by j at pj = p
I is 
independent of p
I (it is equal to N/n), the corresponding elasticity (p
I) is strictly positive 
and increasing in p
I, tending to infinity as p
I tends to infinity.  Equivalently, the RHS of (2) 
is strictly positive and decreasing in p
I, tending to zero as p
I tends to infinity.   Clearly, the 
LHS of (2) is increasing in p
I, taking the value zero when p
I = c and tending to unity as p
I 
tends to infinity.  Thus (2) can be satisfied by one and only one value of p
I; this value is 
strictly greater than each firm’s average cost c, implying positive profits.
13 
  The foregoing argument establishes the existence of a unique IS equilibrium in 
which all firms post the same price.  There may also be IS equilibria in which different 
firms post different prices, either deterministically or stochastically.
14  However, it is easy 
to see that, in any equilibrium of this kind, all prices are greater than c.  (A firm which posts 
the lowest of the equilibrium prices will sell at least the quantity N/n, implying a marginal 
cost of c.  Because of (1), each firm’s price is greater than its marginal cost, so the lowest 
price is greater than c.) 
  IS equilibrium can be interpreted as a state of affairs in which firms take advantage 
of consumers’ cognitive limitations.  Spurious complexity in tariffs prevents consumers 
from making accurate price comparisons.  Because price signals are noisy, a firm can raise 
its price above the level charged by other firms while continuing to find buyers.  This 
allows the market to support prices in excess of marginal and average cost. 
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6.  CS equilibrium 
We now investigate Nash equilibria in which consumers are price-sensitive and in which 
there are common standards.  We begin by defining a particular equilibrium of this kind. 
 In  an  equilibrium with a unique common standard (or CS equilibrium), all firms use 
some common standard s* and set the same price p
C = c.  All consumers use the price-
sensitive decision rule induced by the LCS algorithm.  Thus, each firm sells the quantity 
N/n and makes zero profit.  It is easy to see that this combination of strategies is a Nash 
equilibrium for firms.  Any firm which deviates unilaterally from its equilibrium strategy 
earns strictly negative profit.  If it posts a price greater than c while setting the standard s*, 
it sells nothing because of the price-sensitivity of consumers, but incurs fixed costs.  If it 
posts a price less than c while setting the standard s*, it captures the entire market but sells 
at a loss.  If it deviates from s*, it sells nothing because consumers use the LCS algorithm, 
which shortlists only common-standard firms.  Further, each consumer’s behaviour is 
weakly optimal for her (trivially so, because there is no price variation).   
  The CS equilibrium can be interpreted as a state of affairs in which firms do not 
take advantage of consumers’ cognitive limitations.  Because firms use a single common 
standard, each consumer is able to make accurate ordinal comparisons between the prices 
posted by different firms.  Thus, firms are in Bertrand competition; this induces marginal-
cost pricing. 
  Clearly, marginal-cost pricing can be sustained in equilibrium only if a sufficiently 
large proportion of consumers use decision rules that favour common standards over 
individuated ones (as LCS does).  If, to the contrary, most consumers used decision rules 
that were neutral between common and individuated standards (as SF is) or that favoured 
the latter (as DE does), a putative equilibrium in which all firms set a common standard and 
posted the competitive price would be vulnerable to unilateral deviation by a firm setting an 
individuated standard and posting a higher price.  This is a corollary of the proposition 
(implied by the analysis in Section 5) that there is no IS equilibrium in which all firms post 
the competitive price. 
  Although CS equilibrium is not the only equilibrium in which consumers are price-
sensitive and in which standards are not completely individuated, all such equilibria share 
the main characteristics of CS equilibrium.  First, note that there may be price-sensitive 
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which can thereby support an equilibrium in which all firms use the same standard and post 
the competitive price.  Another possibility is an equilibrium in which, although no firms set 
individuated standards, there are two or more common standards.
15  In any such 
equilibrium, however, all firms post the competitive price.  To see why, consider any 
putative equilibrium in which there are no individuated standards.  For any given standard, 
all firms setting that standard are in Bertrand competition with one another, and so must 
post the same price, equal to the marginal cost of each of those firms.  But, because firms 
are free to switch standards, equilibrium requires that all firms earn the same profit, 
irrespective of which standard they set.
16   Because, by assumption, N/n (the average 
quantity produced by firms) is greater than or equal to q* (MES), there must be at least one 
standard at which the marginal-cost price is c and profit is zero.  Thus, all firms make zero 
profit.  But, because of the properties of the cost function, any firm which makes zero profit 
while pricing at marginal cost must be posting a price equal to c.   
 
7.  Equilibrium with bargains and ripoffs 
It remains to ask whether our model can have a Nash equilibrium in which consumers are 
price-sensitive and there is a mix of individuated and common standards.  The answer is 
that such equilbria are possible; in all such equilibria, common-standard firms post the 
competitive price and individuated-standard firms post higher prices. 
  For simplicity, we show this only for the case in which all individuated-standard 
firms (the ‘IS sector’) post the same price p
I and sell the same quantity q
I, thus earning the 
same profit 
I, and in which all common-standard firms (the ‘CS sector’) set the same 
standard s*, post the same price p
C and sell the same quantity q
C, thus earning the same 
profit 
C.  (The argument can be generalised.) 
  If IS firms sell non-zero quantities in equilibrium, they face downward-sloping 
conjectural demand functions, as in IS equilibrium; thus p
I must be greater than IS firms’ 
marginal cost, C(q
I).  If CS firms sell non-zero quantities in equilibrium, they are in 
Bertrand competition with one another; thus p
C must be equal to CS firms’ marginal cost, 
C(q




Since firms in at least one sector must produce at or above N/n, there is at least one sector 
in which marginal cost equals c (compare the argument in the final paragraph of Section 6).  
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I).  But that is inconsistent with equilibrium, because profits in the CS sector 
cannot be positive.  (In equilibrium, p
C = C(q




C.)   So CS firms produce at or above N/n.  Then these firms have marginal 
cost equal to c, implying p
C = c and 
C = 0.  Equilibrium then requires 
I = 0.  Since IS 
firms price above marginal cost, this is possible only with q
I < q* and p
I > c. 
  In an equilibrium of this kind, as in Salop and Stiglitz’s (1977) model of 
monopolistically competitive price dispersion, there are ‘bargains’ (CS tariffs) and ‘ripoffs’ 
(IS tariffs).  Clearly, such an equilibrium could not be sustained if consumers were fully 
rational, because a firm’s use of a common standard is an observable signal indicating that 
its price is at the competitive level.  Nor could it be sustained in a market in which all 
consumers used the LCS decision rule, since that rule would shortlist only CS firms, 
leaving IS firms with zero sales and negative profit.  But it could be compatible with some 
mixtures of price-sensitive decision rules.  For example, suppose that some consumers use 
the LCS rule while others use DE and/or SF.  LCS consumers buy only from CS firms, but 
some DE and SF consumers pay the higher prices of IS firms.  Depending on the relative 
frequencies of the different decision rules, there could be an equilibrium distribution of 






8.   Learning by consumers 
We have shown that three types of Nash equilibrium (and only these) are consistent with 
the assumption that consumers are price-sensitive.  In one type of equilibrium, exemplified 
by IS equilibrium, spuriously complex tariffs allow prices to be maintained above the 
competitive level.  In a second type, exemplified by CS equilibrium, common standards 
induce Bertrand competition and hence competitive prices; such an equilibrium can be 
maintained only if a sufficiently large proportion of consumers use decision rules which 
favour common standards.  In the third type of equilibrium, common-standard firms posting 
competitive prices coexist with individuated-standard firms posting higher prices; such a 
‘bargains and ripoffs’ equilibrium is possible only if some consumers favour common 
standards and some do not. 
  Notice that in all these equilibria, firms which use common standards post 
competitive prices, while firms which use individuated standards post prices that are higher 
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consumers to buy only from common-standard firms if any such firms exist; in some 
equilibria, this behaviour is strictly optimal.  The implication is that heuristics which favour 
common standards are not only psychologically salient; they are also well-adapted to 
environments in which a variety of equilibria can be encountered.  Markets for consumer 
goods, considered in general, might be thought of as such an environment. 
  The idea of favouring common standards is very general.  It is not tied to any 
specific standard, to any specific firm or firms, or to any specific type of product.  Thus, it 
might be learned in one context and then applied in others.
19  If consumers are boundedly 
rational, gradually learning to follow utility-maximising heuristics, and if there is a general 
tendency for common standards to be associated with low prices, heuristics which favour 
common standards will tend to emerge. 
  A complementary possibility is that disequilibrium behaviour by firms may support 
the process by which consumers learn to favour common standards.  The concept of 
completely randomised standards, as used in the definition of IS equilibrium, is a modelling 
simplification.  The nearest realistic equivalent to randomisation is a situation in which 
each firm changes its standard frequently and unpredictably and, when doing so, avoids 
standards that are currently used by other firms.  If changing standards is costly, or if there 
is some constraint on the frequency with which changes are made, the choice of standards 
becomes a game of strategy between firms.  A crucial component of such a game is the fact 
that, if two or more firms are pricing above the competitive level and if one firm (say i) can 
predict the price and standard that another firm (j) will set in a given period, then i can gain 
sales at j’s expense by replicating j’s standard while undercutting its price.  It is this 
possibility of being undercut that forces firms to keep changing standards, and the constant 
change in standards is essential for the sustainability of non-competitive prices.  But if 
firms are to continue to respond to the possibility of being undercut, the probability of 
being undercut must be non-zero.  Thus, individuated standards and non-competitive prices 
can persist only in combination with episodes of undercutting.  In other words: in a realistic 
form of IS equilibrium, individuated standards will be the norm, but there will be 
occasional episodes of price competition between firms which are temporarily using 
common standards.  A market with these characteristics will provide consumers with 
evidence of the association between common standards and low prices. 
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about.  A realistic form of IS equilibrium will be a state of turbulence in which firms are 
constantly changing standards for tactical purposes, sometimes with the intention of finding 
a standard that is unique to themselves, but sometimes with the contrary intention of 
replicating other firms’ standards and competing on price.  The more frequent are such 
episodes of price competition, the greater is the incentive for consumers to use decision 
rules which favour common standards.  But the greater is the proportion of consumers who 
use such rules, the greater is the incentive for firms to undercut one another.  (A firm that 
undercuts a rival not only takes sales from the rival, but also attracts consumers who favour 
common standards.)  Thus, starting from an equilibrium with IS characteristics, tactical 
manoeuvres by firms might initiate a chain reaction leading to CS equilibrium.  One 
implication of this argument is that the long-run survival of individuated standards may 
require collusion among firms, with some form of tacit agreement that firms do not 
replicate one another’s standards.  (Conversely, a transition from CS to IS equilibrium 
might be brought about by collusion, if sufficiently many firms individuated their standards 
in concert.) 
 
9.  Conclusion 
Our tentative conclusion is that there may be general market mechanisms which, over the 
long run, favour the evolution of common standards.  Spuriously complex tariffs may be 
either a transitory phenomenon in the evolution of markets for particular goods, or 
symptomatic of tacit collusion. 
  We present this conclusion as a contribution to the understanding of markets, and 
not as an argument against regulation.  To the contrary, our analysis can be read as a 
rationale for some degree of light-touch regulation to impose common standards on tariff 
structures.  Such regulation is ‘light-touch’ in the sense that it supports a transition from 
one Nash equilibrium (with high prices) to another (with low prices); once the transition is 
complete, and provided that firms are not able to collude, the regulation may be self-
enforcing.  Expressing the qualification about collusion in a different way, the imposition 
of common standards might be interpreted as an anti-collusion policy.  Further, it may not 
be necessary that all firms are regulated; all that is needed is that the number of firms that 
are required to use a common standard is enough to initiate a process of transition and to 
  22
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 084ensure that, once an common-standard equilibrium has become established, unregulated 
firms cannot increase their profits by collusively switching to individuated standards.   
   Nevertheless, we believe that any discussion of regulation should take account of 
the self-regulating powers of the market system.  One should be cautious about inferring, 
from the growing evidence of the cognitive limitations of economic agents, that 
unregulated markets necessarily overburden consumers’ decision-making capacities.  It is 
important to consider how decision heuristics and pricing conventions might evolve to help 
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Notes 
 
1 At the time of writing, there are some indications that long-standing conventions about 
add-ons in the airline industry are breaking down.  Very recently, ‘full-service’ airlines 
have started to introduce new add-on charges, for example for checked baggage.  It is too 
early to know whether these new practices will become the norm.  However, the fact that 
these add-ons are being introduced by different airlines at almost the same time is 
suggestive of tipping from one equilibrium to another (or of tacit collusion).  This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the previous common standard was a convention, even if 
not a fully stable one. 
2  http://www.travelodge.co.uk/common_room_questions 
3  In fact, 1 Imperial gallon = 4.5454 litre, so B is cheapest. 
4  Our problem bears some resemblance to the Monty Hall problem.  Imagine a game show 
in which the contestant chooses one of three closed boxes, and wins the contents of that 
box.  Suppose that the value of each box has been drawn independently from a binary 
distribution over the values £0 (with probability 2/3) and £1000 (with probability 1/3). The 
show's host, who knows the value of each box, selects two boxes at random and then points 
to one of these, informing the contestant that it is at least as valuable as the other.  (If they 
are equally valuable, the one he points to is selected at random.)  Then, by the reasoning in 
the main text, the contestant should open the pointed-to box.  Now suppose this game is 
changed so that exactly one box contains £1000 (i.e. the random draws are not independent) 
and the contestant (rather than a random mechanism) selects the two boxes for which the 
host will provide ranking information.  It is still optimal to choose the pointed-to box.  But 
the revised problem is just a re-framing of the Monty Hall problem.  In the Monty Hall 
problem, the contestant selects the two boxes for which information will be given by 
‘provisionally choosing’ the remaining box; the host provides the ranking information by 
opening an empty box; the contestant is then invited to ‘switch’ boxes.  
5  There are some similarities between our model of pricing standards and Dudley’s (1990) 
model of the location choices of retail firms.  In our model, common pricing standards both 
induce and signal Bertrand competition.  In Dudley’s model, common spatial locations both 
induce and signal Cournot competition. 
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6  Some of our results would not hold for a market with only two firms.  In our model, the 
demand conditions for a firm which shares a standard with at least one other firm are 
different from those for a firm whose standard is unique to itself.  Our analysis of ‘CS 
equilibrium’,  in which all firms use the same standard, relies on the property that if one 
firm deviated from that standard, the other firms would still share a standard. 
7  For modelling purposes, we assume that each tariff has one and only one standard.  This 
implies that the set of tariffs can be partitioned into subsets, each of which is defined by a 
single standard; accurate ordinal comparisons can be made between tariffs if and only if 
they belong to the same subset.  We neglect the complication that, in reality, the sets within 
which ordinal comparisons can be made might overlap. 
8  In the simple case represented by our model, all complexity is spurious.  Thus, a 
regulation which imposed a common standard could not harm consumers (although it might 
reduce firms’ profits).  Even if the case for such a regulation seems uncontroversial, this 
should not be seen as an objection to our model.  Our aim is to investigate whether common 
standards can emerge and be sustained without regulation. 
9  Cost functions of the MES type are generated if there are constant returns to scale in 
production but the firm has fixed costs in the form of a commitment to buy a minimum 
vector of inputs.  As a simple example, let q be output and let lk be the quantity of input k 
used in production (k = 1, .., m).  Assume a Leontief production function q = mink(lk/ak), 
where (a1, ..., am) is a vector of positive coefficients.  For each input k there is a unit price 
wk and a minimum quantity lk which the firm is committed to buying.  Thus, expenditure 
on each input k is wkmax(lk, lk).  This gives a piecewise linear MES total cost function. 
10 By assuming that the distribution of ehi is the same for all tariffs, we abstract from the 
possibility that some standards are more difficult to understand than others.  Our hunch is 
that people’s intuitive sense of ‘simplicity’ in tariffs, product specifications, labelling, and 
so on is often a matter of convention: it is easier to process information if it comes in 
familiar forms.  Our concern in this paper is with the emergence of common standards, not 
with ‘intrinsic’ simplicity. 
11 Thus, we do not discuss the trivial equilibrium in which all firms post the monopoly price 
 and consumers choose between firms at random, ignoring price signals.  In this 
equilibrium, consumers’ behaviour is weakly optimal but not price-sensitive. 
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12  Perloff and Salop assume that each consumer h chooses the firm i such that hi – pi is 
maximised, where pi is the price charged by firm i and hi is a random variable representing 
the ‘value’ of firm i’s product to consumer h.  The latter variable plays the same role as  – 
ehi in our model. 
13 We are assuming that (2) is satisfied at a value of p
I less than , permitting an internal 
solution.  If this is not the case, there is a corner solution at the monopoly price p
I = . 
14 We are unable to prove any general result about the existence or non-existence of such 
equilibria.  Perloff and Salop (1985) report that they are unable to prove corresponding 
general results for their model. 
15 This would not be possible if all consumers used the LCS rule, since that rule favours the 
common standard that is used by the largest number of firms.  However, an equilibrium 
could be supported by other decision rules that favour common standards over individuated 
ones.   
16 Here we abstract from discontinuities caused by the lumpiness of firms’ market shares.  
Strictly, if the number of firms using each standard is small, the Nash equilibrium condition 
that no firm can increase its profit by changing standards implies only that cross-standard 
profit differences are small. 
17 Again, we abstract from problems of discontinuity.  Compare note 14. 
18 For further analysis of this case, see Gaudeul and Sugden (2007). 
19 Compare Sugden’s (2004b, pp. 49-54) discussion of how conventions can spread from 
one context to another by analogy: rules which have more general application and are more 
susceptible to analogy are better equipped to reproduce themselves.  See also Marks (2002). 
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